Close calls are abundant within the packrafting community—serious injuries and fatalities are rare.

The most consistent theme in packrafting fatalities is getting separated from boats and partners, typically in cold and/or surprisingly swift (high) water. Separation has been due to rapids, inexperience, or high winds. Insufficient safety equipment (PFD and/or drysuit) was common in earlier incidents, and less so more recently. You can also see a progression of the fatalities from Alaska-centric, to global, from the 1990s to today.

There is a concerted effort to efficiently develop a “Culture of Safety” for packrafters in the hopes that we can skip the history of incidents that our peers in other water crafts have experienced. To the degree possible, these incidents were used to inform the content of The Packraft Handbook.

For a broader dataset, refer to American Whitewater’s incident database.

• Map locations are general guesses.
• “Flush drowning” describes drowning by aspiration during a long/difficult swim, as opposed to entrapment or submersion.

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23. Nanshi River, Taiwan (2023-06-04)

Probable Factors

• Improper use of equipment (removed life vest during swim)
• Undercut/sieve hazards

Grade: Class III+

28-year-old Ziqi Lin capsized and was immediately separated from his packraft in a recirculating hole on the Nanshi River. Apparently he removed his PFD (but I’m curious if it could have come off on its own). Ziqi’s boat and life vest were soon recovered but it took another month to recover his body. All three packrafters in the party were wearing life vests; the two survivors are reported to be novice paddlers.

Based on the video clips, the river looks to be Class III/IV in difficulty, with low water at the time of the incident and considerable undercut and sieve hazard (large rocks).

This YouTube video discusses the incident. Most of the video is about general river running strategies. The parts most relevant to this incident are 1) not setting up safety and 2) taking off the life vest.

References

Taiwan News
Focus Taiwan
udn.com

22. Pshekha River, Russia (2023-04-18)

Probable Factors

• Equipment hazards (paddle leash, improperly fit helmet?)

Grade: Class III

Belarusian paddler Roman Khlebin, 39, capsized and drowned while paddling the Pshekha River, Russia.

As usual, the details are lost in translation, but here’s what I can figure out. Facts first.

Roman might have been part of a larger tour group rafting the river (mostly citizens of Belarus). But the incident seems to have happened as a group of four.

The team of four split into two pairs: Roman and a partner ran the Waterfall (Водопадный) Rapid, while the second pair set safety with throw ropes at the end of the rapid, at least 40 m downstream. This section of the river is fast-moving and continuous, with limited opportunities to eddy-out. Roman capsized and swam 10-12 meters and was then able to stand in an eddy. He appeared to be in control, with his packraft floating upside-down next to him.

The safety team was at the end of the rapid, 25 meters downstream. After seeing Roman in control in the eddy, they ran upstream to offer assistance. The shoreline is complicated and they temporarily lost sight of Roman during which time he was somehow swept back into the current.

Roman’s helmet came off during this second swim and he was found with a head injury.

This part is speculation: one of the team members suggested that Roman might have been entangled by the paddle leash that connected the paddle to the packraft.

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Interpretation and lessons learned:

It seems like most of these case studies can be broken down into equipment, human factors (decision-making), and preparation/training.

Equipment: It is well-established that leashes don’t belong on turbulent water. When I read the report and came to that detail, I cursed out loud. It also sounds like Roman’s helmet might not have fit him properly. A well-fit helmet should not come off—that’s the point.

Decision-making: This team set safety, some members decided not to run the rapid, etc. This is all excellent.

Preparation: My instructor mentors often emphasize how hard it is to know and teach where to set safety. This is especially true in continuous rapids. Forty meters is not particularly long, especially in such swift water, and I suspect I would have set safety in the same position as this team. But this is what I really want to know … how do we learn to foresee all of the possibilities and set safety that truly protects the site?

References

Information from an event participant
Zerkalo news
Belarus news

21. Lake Rotorua, New Zealand (2022-10-26)

Probable Factors

• Solo

Grade: Open water

A Frenchman was reported overdue around the northern end of Lake Rotorua. Authorities recovered a “black and yellow inflatable kayak” on the 25th, and the paddler one week later.

Very speculative, but a nearby airport reported SE wind gusts of 44 km/h (27 mph) on the 25th. Wind is a common factor in open water incidents.

References

1 News: Search, boat found, body found

20. Tsaina River, Alaska (2022-07-16)

Probable Factors

• No dry suit
• Cold water

Grade: Class I/II (Class IV elsewhere on river)

The Valdez search and rescue team responded to an inReach alert regarding a missing packrafter. The reporting party was reached and assisted within hours, and the missing packrafter was found, deceased, on rocks farther downriver.

The Incident Report from the Alaska Department of Public Safety includes a few more details:

Christopher Roby (54) and his partner “had been out hiking for several weeks and were using pac rafts to make key crossing points on the river.” Chris was a former Navy Seal and experienced outdoorsman. This is the fourth incident on record where packrafts were being used for crossings and not downstream travels.

“They were on their last day of the trip and working their way out. Chris had gotten out in the faster water and hit some rapids that turned his raft over.” Based on drone footage, I think it is more accurate to describe the ‘rapids’ as swift water. This is a braided section of the river without distinct rapids.

Chris’ partner saw Chris holding on to his raft while floating down river, and then lost sight of him. The partner capsized while trying to catch up with Chris, and then let go of his raft and swam to shore, where he initiated the inReach SOS.

Chris’ partner said that in his experience, “holding on to the raft will keep you out in the faster water.” [Luc: in my words, this is: prioritize yourself and let go of your equipment if there is any indication that it inhibits your ability to get out of the water.]

This is not in the Incident Report, but based on photos, it appears that Chris was not dressed for immersion (not wearing a dry suit). I assume he did not have a helmet (because he was using the raft for crossings and not downriver travel). I can’t tell if he wore a PFD.

References

ADN News article
City of Valdez press release

19. Bugaboo Creek, British Columbia (2022-06-19)

Probable Factors

• Solo
• High water
• Improper equipment (packraft not intended for whitewater)

Grade: Class III

Virginia resident Peter Jolles, 46, was reported overdue at a Bugaboo Creek takeout, British Columbia, and has not yet been located.

Peter was visiting BC for an adventure race and stayed after the race to continue exploring the region. He road scouted a section of the Bugaboo and determined that it was below his skill level. I don’t know for certain which section Peter was paddling, but I see a 6-km stretch of Class II/III water that could be scouted from the road. A guidebook describes the area above and below this section as Class V. Neither Class V section is scoutable from the road.

Peter was wearing full personal protective equipment (dry suit, PFD, helmet). Peter was paddling alone, in an Alpacka Raft Scout, which is not intended for use in whitewater. Rescue personnel recovered Peter’s packraft but had to discontinue search efforts due to high water conditions.

Here’s the takeaway lesson for me (if I’m correct that he was on Class II/III water): Incidents rarely occur due to one obvious mistake. I appreciate the swiss-cheese model of incident causation to visualize this … incidents occur when a bunch of small holes line up perfectly wrong. In this case … it is likely that Peter didn’t get to see the hardest rapids from the road, he was in a boat that wasn’t designed for whitewater, the water was high, wood was likely in the river, and maybe the biggest hole: he was paddling alone. How can we prevent holes from lining up? A good starting point is to keep a visual of this model in mind, recognize and acknowledge all of the little decisions that can lead to an incident.

References

USARA statement regarding Peter Jolles
CTV News, Vancouver

18. Caples River, New Zealand (2021-11-22)

Probable Factors

• Effectively solo
• Presumed flush drowning
• Wood hazards were present and the boat was damaged, but nobody really knows what happened
• High water

Grade: Class II+

Stephen Andrew Bowler, 30, died in a packrafting incident on the Caples River, New Zealand. Rescuers responded to a PLB (personal location beacon) SOS call.

Stephen and two partners were on a three-day packrafting excursion. At normal water levels, the river is Class II with three gorges of greater difficulty. The first two gorges feature Class III/IV drops and frequent wood hazards. The water was high, estimated at three times median flow.

The group had committed to portaging all of the gorges, but Stephen re-assessed and decided to run the first gorge, alone.

Stephen’s boat was punctured and his helmet showed signs of impact, but not necessarily from this incident. He was wearing a life vest but not a dry suit.

References

Queenstown man killed in rafting accident was passionate about wildlife
River description: Caples River

17. Tama River, Japan (2021-09)

Probable Factors

• Paddle leash (entanglement)

Grade: Class I+

Two packrafters were paddling the Class I+ section of the Tama River (western Tokyo) when one paddler snagged on submerged or partly-submerged river debris—metal wire or a loop. The paddler was in their 70s, and it is suspected that their paddle leash snagged the debris. It is not clear if they were in the boat or swimming when they came into contact with the debris.

Thanks to Shimon Saito for collecting and sharing this information.

16. Eagle River, Juneau, Alaska (2021-09)

Probable Factors

• High water
• Entrapment (wood)

Grade: Class II/III (?)

There is not much information about this fatality yet.

Two packrafters swam in Eagle River (you can get a sense for the nature of the river from this video taken a bit upstream), with overnight equipment. Jeffrey DeRonde was trapped in river debris (I assume wood) and fully submerged.

Jeff worked in the boating safety sector of the Coast Guard (a competent swimmer) and had assisted/completed swiftwater training in May of this year.

References

Juneau Police Department information release (2021-09-07)
Juneau Empire article

15. Levaya Mama, Russia (2021-08-20)

[Higher resolution imagery via Esri]

Probable Factors

• Presumed flush drowning (difficult swim through rocks)
• High water

Grade: III

Three packrafters capsized in the Delicsky rapids (Деликские каскады) section of Levaya Mama River (Baikal region of Russia).

On 18-19.08.21 it drizzled, the water level rose. 08/19/21 we all successfully passed the Straight Rapid on the Levaya Mama River (category 3). 08.20.21 to 13:20 we approached the rapid of the Delikskiy cascade (category 3). During the passage of the rapid, all our three boats were overturned, two of us managed to reach the right bank. 2 packrafts and 2 paddles were lost, one paddle and 1 packraft remained.

Pyotr Kirienko was unable to swim to shore. His partners found him after thirty minutes and performed CPR, but recovery was not possible. The group was evacuated three days later by helicopter.

The party members discussed and identified these factors as relevant causes:

The rapidly risen water level, that had changed the complexity level of the rapid, overestimation of our own capabilities and underestimation of the severity of the obstacle were the cause of what happened. The immediate cause of Peter’s death was apparently the inability to swim out of the rapid “barrel” (reverse water flow [backwash]), possibly a stone hitting.

The team had helmets, but not drysuits. The water temperature was not cold.

The rapids consist of steep drops and boulder gardens, as described in this link: river description (go to [4]). This photo might be from this section of the river.

RefEreNCES

Thanks to Konstantin Gridnevskiy and Taras Popov for sharing this information.

EMERCOM article
Arigus article

14. Inzer River, Russia (2020-05-01)

Probable Factors

• Entanglement
• Solo

Grade: Class II- (?)

May 1st: A Russian man, Yalil Kuvandykov, was seen to overturn in his boat on the Inzer River, Russia. Rescuers were notified, but unable to save him. One article suggests that he was missing for days, but I suspect this is just a google translate issue.

What is clear is that Yalil had a leash attaching himself to the boat and was trapped by the leash (not the black rope in the photo below – that is part of the coaming). This is the first verified packraft fatality due to entanglement. Yalil also had fishing equipment and a perimeter line on the bow that ripped through one of the tie-down attachment points. It is unclear if these were involved in the fatality.

References

mkset.ru (Russian)
KP.RU (Russian)
Gorobzor.ru (Russian)
GTRK TV (Russian)

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13. Lake Nahuel Huapi, Argentina (2020-01-29)

Probable Factors

• Wind (fetch)
• Cold water
• No dry/wet suit

Grade: Open water

An Englishman was separated from his packraft while attempting a two kilometer lake crossing in Argentina. “Nahuel Huapi took them by surprise with violent waves, hit their boats and threw them into the water.” A second boater was able to recover her boat, presumably re-enter, and paddle to shore. She was hypothermic when she reached help.

The paddlers were two weeks into a bikepacking trip. The article does not discuss prior experience but mentions that they had life jackets and insufficient insulation layers given the water temperature. The geography of the lake system provides 30 km of wind fetch before the crossing point. One-meter waves were reported on shore after the incident.

This is the third open water packraft fatality on record, highlighting the danger of open water crossings.

References

Bariloche2000 article (spanish)

View this post on Instagram

A post shared by Tom Mckendrick (@thomas.mckendrick)

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12. Nagara River, Japan (2020-01)

Probable Factors

• Solo
• Entanglement by paddle leash

Grade: Class II+, III-

Facts are very limited because the boater was alone with no witnesses. A man was found submerged under a packraft, trapped in an undercut rock, mid-river. He had a paddle leash attached to his spray skirt pull loop. There is a challenging rapid 500m upriver, and it seems likely that he tipped there and swam until he was pinned on the undercut rock.

The rest of this is conjecture. Based on his YouTube channel, hidasurf might only have had three months experience, liked running steep creeks at shallow water (Class II-III), and was often or always paddling alone. He had a full safety kit (PFD, helmet, drysuit), frequently scouted rapids, and frequently swam.

Given that his body was recovered with his boat, I assume he was trapped with it. Youtube videos of his boat don’t show any perimeter lines, but do show a red leash connecting his paddle to the spray skirt grab loop. We can’t know for sure, but the leash seems most likely to have caused entanglement. I noticed a swim in one of his videos where he holds onto the boat by looping an arm through the deck combing, so that might have played a factor in his fatal swim as well.

References

https://www.gifu-np.co.jp/news/20200120/20200120-208121.html (Japanese)
Shimon Saito, personal communication

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11. Brooks Range, Alaska (2019)

Probable Factors

• High water
• Cold water

Grade: Class II

Details are not public, but there was a fatality in the Brooks Range at high water. If you know details, please do not post them as comments on this page until (if/when) a public incident report is available.

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10. Þingvallavatn Lake, Iceland (2019)

Probable factors

• Inclement weather (wind)
• Solo
• Cold water

Grade: Open water

Bjørn Debacker, a 41-year old Belgian Engineer, was presumably separated from his packraft due to wind and waves while crossing Þingvallavatn lake. Bjørn’s empty raft and pack were found on the southern shore of the lake, ~12 km away from where he camped the night before (northern shore).

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9. Nass River, British Columbia (2019-08-28)

Probable factors

• Solo

Grade: Class IV

Romain Quénéhen, a Belgian on a roadtrip from BC to Alaska, went missing on the Nass River, BC, Romain’s packraft and backpack were recovered. Satellite imagery shows large rapids just out of sight from his probable put in. It is likely that the rapids caught Romain off guard.

References

https://www.terracestandard.com/news/search-called-off-for-nass-river-kayaker/
https://www.haidagwaiiobserver.com/news/belgian-man-linked-as-possible-missing-kayaker-in-nass-river/

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8. Nizina River, Wrangell-St. Elias, Alaska (2018)

Probable factors

• No PFD or drysuit
• Cold water
• Limited experience

Grade: Class II

Aidan Don (22) and a friend were dropped off by airplane at Nizina Lake, intending to float the Nizina back down to McCarthy. The Nizina is Class II where Aidan flipped out of his boat, but very cold and choked with glacial silt.

Neither boater wore PFDs (or drysuits, I assume). There has been some discussion about how they were able to rent boats without safety equipment.

References

American Whitewater Incident Report

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7. Lion’s Head, Matanuska River, Alaska (2017-07-15)

Probable factors

• Flush drowning
• Cold water

Grade: Class IV

Martin Rinke (63), an experienced boater, fell out of his boat in the Lion’s Head section of Matanuska River. Lion’s Head, Class IV, is known for its big hydraulics and difficulty distinguishing rocks from water due to both being the same gray color. The AW incident report mentions an IK and kayak, but Martin was in a packraft. Martin had considerable experience.

Marty lived above the Matanuska River near the Lions Head run. This was home water for him. Two weeks after running sections of the lower Mat with Marty he led the same group of 4 on Lions head. On July 15, 2017 river level was slightly higher than Marty’s highest run (number not recorded). Marty had extensive wilderness experiences throughout his lifetime.

All scouted and ran the first rapid as planned then pulling over river right. Marty then led the group from shore down stream. About 2 minutes into this run he went over a hole and flipped. He was seen to make 3 attempts to reenter his boat then appeared to rest. Moments later he went through another hole and was separated from his boat.

The second boater attempting to land river left flipped and lost his boat. The third boater noted Marty floating face up, pursued, caught and swam Marty to shore on river right, where CPR was unsuccessful. 

The fourth boater exited river left then searched down stream with #2. After contact by cell phone they walked out to Mat Glacier view area. Nova Alaska Guides extricated Marty and boater #3.

All boaters had dry suits, helmets and PFD’s. Marty was swift water rescue trained, as was boater #3. All boats were Alpacka Llamas. Marty’s was custom extended approx. 2.5 inches to accommodate his long legs. He had a perimeter line in addition to bow and stern painters. #3 boat was lost when it was released to pull Marty from the water. In all 3 of 4 boats were lost; all were later recovered by good Samaritans and/or Nova Alaska Guides.

Lessons learned: Discuss rescue methods and plans before the run, practice boat reentry – often, have communication devices inside dry suit, have contact numbers for each boater and rescue services (911 did an excellent job in this case and could locate caller).

– John Quimby

References

American Whitewater Incident Report
John Quimby, personal communication

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6. Kangerlussuaq, Greenland (2015)

Probable factors

• Inclement weather (wind)
• Solo
• Cold water

Grade: Open water

In the summer of 2015 a German paddler disappeared in the Søndre Strømfjord near Kangerlussuaq, Greenland. He was paddling down the fjord during a multi-day trip. He checked in with his PLB the evening before. It appears to have been windy on the fjord on the day he disappeared. The Søndre Strømfjord is an almost linear, 170 km fjord which can funnel strong winds from the ice sheet.

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5. Tana River, Wrangell-St. Elias, Alaska (2014-08-09)

Probable factors

• Flush drowning
• Cold water
• No drysuit
• Significant experience, but considerable discomfort with water

Grade: Class II

As part of the Alaska Mountain Wilderness Classic, Rob Kehrer (44) and Greg Mills portaged the Tana River Canyon (Class IV), putting in below the technical features. The nature of the river at their put in was cold, silty, with large hydraulics, but technically Class II. Rob flipped in some of the big water hydraulics and was instantly separated from his boat and Greg.

Rob was wearing rain gear and a PFD. I believe he had some gear essentials (stove, etc.) in his pockets, which would have worked against his PFD’s buoyancy. It is likely that a dry suit would have made a huge difference. The Wilderness Classic participants generally do not use drysuits.

References

American Whitewater Incident Report
Greg Mills, personal communication

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4. Katete River, Alaska (2012-06-22)

Probable factors

• Presumed flush drowning
• High water
• Cold water
• Solo

Grade: Unknown

Colin Buness (25) disappeared on a solo trip to the Katate, a tributary to the Stikine. Colin had considerable experience, including Class IV paddling and actively training to become an ANG Pararescue Jumper (PJ). Rescuers found his packraft in a log jam.

“We found his foot tracks in a gravel bar where we believe he had pulled in and looked downriver,” Tim said. “We think he was scouting out the canyon and everything looked good to him, but he couldn’t see around the corner of that bend, which is where we feel that he went into the water.”

References

Wrangell Sentinel

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3. Sag River (Brooks Range), Alaska (2009-09)

Probable factors

• No PFD or drysuit
• Cold water
• Limited experience?

Grade: Class II

Jaymes H. Schoenberg (22) and a partner used packrafts to cross the swollen Sagavanirktok River en route to Arctic Village. Jaymes overturned his boat and was quickly separated from his partner. He was not wearing a PFD.

References

Packraft Forum
Fairbanks Daily News Miner, page 1 and 6

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2. Sheep River, Alaska (1997-08-29)

Probable factors

• Entanglement
• High water
• No dry suit or PFD

Grade: Class I/II (Class IV elsewhere on river)

Thomas Aho was tangled in cord while using an inflatable raft to transport equipment across Sheep River at high water. It feels important to emphasize that the boat was only carried and used for crossing rivers, not paddling downstream.

The description that follows is from Tom’s son, Brian.

I was 18 years old when my dad drowned and my younger brother Sven and I got stuck in the wilderness without gear for a few more days.

The son of a trapper, prospector, fisherman (and other typical Alaskan occupations), Tom was born and raised in Anchorage. In his free time he was an avid outdoorsman and competitive mountain runner. His close friends included Barney and Dick Griffith. He was very tough and had great endurance but I don’t think formal outdoor safety training was readily available back then.

In 1997, we decided to hike from Independence Mine in Hatcher Pass across the Talkeetna Mountains to Iron Creek and the Talkeetna River. We had one packraft and a length of 3mm polyester cord, but no life vests or dry suits. We knew we would need to cross at least the Kashwitna River, Sheep Creek, and Sheep River along the way. Generally, the plan was to have one person (with gear) use the raft and tie the poly cord to the boat so that the next person could pull the boat back until everyone was on the other side.

The morning we arrived at Sheep River it was sunny and pleasant after days of rain. We scouted the river bank for a while to find a suitable spot for the crossing and picked an area where the river was very wide, with a gravel bar dividing the deep main channel from a smaller, secondary channel.

We prepared for the crossing by putting on our rain gear and we all ate a snack. Meanwhile, my dad began to ferry all the backpacks to the gravel bar. Before his last run, he asked for my camera so he could take pictures of us paddling across. I unclipped the camera pouch, which also contained my knife, and handed it to my dad.

We tied one end of the poly cord to a large tree. I did not see how he attached the other end but we later found out that he had tied it to himself, rather than the raft.

The cord was not long enough. Before he reached the gravel bar, the current took the raft too far downstream and the raft capsized. My dad got pinned in the river by the rope and the channel was too deep to stand in.

Without a knife or backpack, I had no tools and the river bank offered no sharp objects. The knot could not be undone under tension. I got into the water but the river was too cold and mighty. Eventually we managed to fray and break the rope by rubbing it against a branch. It was too late. We never saw him again.

It rained the following days and the rising water washed away the backpacks during the first night. Briefly, they had served as a landmark in the middle of the river, if anyone came looking for us. But no one was expecting us for at least 1 or 2 more days and the weather was too poor for flying.

Almost immediately after the accident, we began collecting materials to build shelter, rocks for SOS signage, and we dried out my clothes that had gotten wet in the river. We knew we were within the search corridor that rescuers would concentrate on, based on the maps and information we provided to friends prior to our departure. We gathered berries for food and marked the time with the shadow from a stick in the sand, that functioned as a basic sun dial. Survival was relatively straightforward but we eventually had to abandon our shelter in an area that was more visible from the air and seek protection from the rain under larger trees.

We also knew that we were only a few miles from Rainbow Lake and assumed that it might be used by hunters/floatplane pilots to access the area. Several times each day we called for help across the rushing river and into the wilderness, hoping someone might pick up our voice. After 4 days the weather improved and we made contact with someone who popped out of the woods on the other side of the river. A State Trooper helicopter spotted us a couple hours later.

Even after 25+ years, dealing with the trauma is an ongoing process. For the first 10 years I couldn’t get into any boat at all. I always carried a knife. Other fatal incidents happened around me, including the unrelated deaths of both pilots who flew the helicopter when we were rescued, and the death of one of the volunteers who searched for my dad. Later, a girlfriend committed suicide. However, not long after I graduated from university with a degree in aerospace engineering, I moved back to Alaska, joined AMRG, and have been part of the search and rescue community myself for 15 years now.

I hope this information is useful to someone. Definitely don’t recommend using the rope the way we did. Seems obvious looking back but the accident happened nonetheless. Also had lots of things go well, thanks to the trip preparation that helped with maintaining a positive mindset after the incident.

Can’t emphasize hands-on training enough. Whether it’s a swiftwater rescue class, avalanche awareness/rescue, medical training specific for wilderness settings (e.g. WFR), technical rope rescue, incident management training, etc., so much boils down to human factor, awareness of the environment, and proper risk management.

-Brian Aho, July, 2023

References

Text from Alaska Daily News article

1. White River, Alaska (1993-06-23)

Probable factors

• Solo
• Cold water
• No PFD
• Limited experience

Grade: Class II

This is the first packraft fatality on record, and predates the ‘modern’ era of packrafts designed for downriver travel, circa 2000.

“The body of P.K. [Peter Kysar], 28, of Alexandria, Virginia, was recovered from the headwaters of the White River near the toe of Russell Glacier on Saturday, July 3rd. P.K. apparently flipped his small raft shortly after putting in and quickly encountered violent waves and hydraulics. It’s believed that his body was held underwater for at least six days, as the area where it was found had been searched many times by dog teams, ground searchers and aircraft, including a military Blackhawk helicopter equipped with infrared radar.”

“P.K., 28, was reported to be three days overdue from an ambitious solo backpacking and float trip. He was dropped off by an air taxi at Glacier Creek and planned to hike the Chitistone Canyon, climb over Skolai Pass, cross the Russell Glacier, then float down the White River in a small pack raft. The total distance for his route was about 120 miles. He then intended to float to the Alcan Highway in the Yukon. P.K. was last seen about 15 miles into his trip on June 22nd, and was reported to have had sufficient food for only five more days. He also reportedly lost his prescription glasses in a river crossing.”

Additional details from a Washington Post article mention that Peter had limited experience rafting in cold water and was not wearing a PFD.

References

Wrangell / St. Elias NPS Incident reports
Washington Post article

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